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Abstract 
Did the creation of the euro affect economic growth? To address this question, 
we estimate a simple growth model and we found an insignificant impact of the euro on 
GDP per head however when we look for differentiated impacts the GDP growth of the 
six members that founded the European Union was negatively affected by the creation 
of the euro across all period. Lastly, the GIIPS were the only group statistically affect 
by the crisis when we look to the impact of it in different groups.  
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The advent of the euro was the next step of European Union integration, a joint currency 
that allowed companies to easily trade between members states, less uncertainty not only for 
companies, but also for regular citizens that would have more freedom of choice and from that 
we could hope for a positive impact in economic growth. The euro in fact can positively affect 
income and efficiency, since it allows more macroeconomic stability through lower exchange 
rate volatility, higher transparency on financial markets and discipline enhancing fiscal rules. 
It also contributes to higher efficiency through trade since integration promotes competition 
that has a positive effect on physical and human capital and therefore on growth 
(Baldwin,1992). 
On the other hand, the euro does not allow each country to devalue their currency and 
this can be problematic for countries facing asymmetric shocks. Problems like this lead some 
opinion makers to defend more integration to close the gaps between countries while others 
contest that the euro is impaired and their countries most leave the euro. 
Considering all these divergent effects that the euro might have, after 18 years of 
integration, to our knowledge, no work has tried to access whether EU Membership made a 
difference for economic growth. In this paper, we use a cross section estimation like Barro 
(1991) but using Panel Data to investigate to what extent the creation of euro affected economic 
growth and if in fact the periphery’s economic growth has been that much damaged by the 
single currency. 
We use a Fixed Effect Model with data from all OECD countries to estimate a basic 
model with capability to predict real GDP growth, methodology used by Easterly (2005) and 
recently by Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2010), among others. Then augmented it by 
introducing a dummy for Euro Area expecting to capture the effect of the single currency on 
Economic Growth. A similar method was used by de Sousa and Lochard (2011) to investigate 
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whether the single currency positively impacts Foreign Direct Investment.  We also want to 
access the impact of the euro in different groups of countries, however we are not interested in 
capture the idiosyncrasy of each country, each is a question in the scope of member state policy. 
The work is organized as follow; section 2 reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 
describes the data and the methodology used; Second 4 presents the empirical result; Section 5 
concludes. 
2.Literature Review 
To our knowledge, nobody tried to access if the EA membership has an impact on 
growth after controlling for other effects. The euro was the great political happening of this 
century and countries that entered the euro zone expected returns from implementation of the 
euro, and one of those is certainly more economic growth. 
The single currency has as benefits exchange rate certainty, more integrated financial 
markets and price stability (Mundell,1961). Adding to this it is view that a country decentralized 
monetary authority will be more able to commit to monetary rules (Silva and Tenreyro, 2010). 
For this reason, the euro can positively influence income through more macroeconomic 
stability. When trade partners are in the same currency area conversion costs are eliminated, 
therefore they will have lower transaction costs and a deeper integration in goods and capital 
markets is expected ( Glick and Rose (2016) finds a positive impact between the European 
monetary Union and trade). And larger markets will increase competition (also enhanced by 
higher price transparency) between companies and that will optimally result in increase of 
efficiency in the use of physical and human capital (Baldwin, 1992). These conditions can, for 
example, increase investment flows towards these countries, however FDI does not have a 




The euro is not an optimal currency area (Grauwe 2006) it incorporates some problems 
that can be harmful for growth and that opinion makers use eagerly to criticize the euro. 
Namely, asymmetric shocks, in face of price rigidities may lead to macro instability that is 
harmful to growth. For some countries, cost may exceed benefits. Hence, our research. 
Growth theoretical literature can be traced back to Ramsey (1928), neoclassic model is 
still important to explain the convergences forces where poor countries tend to catch up to rich 
ones (Solow ,1956). However, there is a consensus in the literature that: (i) growth can be 
affected by accumulation of capital through more investment in physical, human capital and 
R&D; (ii) growth is associated with technological progress; (iii) differences in growth can be 
explained by macroeconomic environment, i.e., the quality of policies and economic 
institutions (Barro, 2013). Therefore, the euro can positively affect growth by improving the 
quality of the economic environment enhancing incentives to produce and invest. 
Many studies tried to capture the effects of policies and institutions on economic growth. 
After the surge of endogenous growth models there has an outbreak of empirical estimation of 
growth models using cross-country data. Barro (1991) related initial level of per capita output 
and other variables with economic growth using a simple cross-country model. Barro (1991) 
found evidence of conditional convergence estimating the model with variables of initial 
income level and controlling for education, school enrollment at secondary and primary levels 
(proxy for human capital). 
More recent papers of economic growth use a panel data methodology to exploit time 
series and cross-sectional variation, approach that is closer to what I want to study since to 
analyze the impact of the euro on growth we need time variance but at the same time need to 
control for the behavior of non-euro economies.  
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2010) used a fixed effect model for a panel data of 
12-euro area economies from 1970 to 2011 and found a non-linear impact of government debt 
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on growth of per capita GDP. They estimate for growth rates of one year and cumulative 
overlapping and non-overlapping growth rates of five years to capture long term impacts. So, 
at the end they found evidence that, in the euro area, high government debt negatively affects 
yearly growth but also longer-term growth. Easterly (2005) tried to measure the impact of 
policies on five-year average real per capita growth between 1960 and 2000, using various 
methods he found that only extreme policies (for example, high inflation) would have an impact 
in growth, despite that in the fixed-effect approach we found that the variables inflation, black 
market premium as well as currency overvaluing are the only variables to have relevant within 
variation.  
Grauwe and Ji (2016) relates economic growth with rigidities in labor market using a 
sample of 32 OECD countries, and states, controlling for variables like government 
consumption, investment ratio to GDP and the proportion of population with tertiary education,  
that employment protection does not have a clear importance on growth, and that it cannot be 
the reason to explain the poor performance (after 2010) of the euro zone in growth terms when 
compared with the rest of the European Union and USA but instead, he argues, that it must be 
related with demand sided problems and the fact that the adjustment process being all supported 
by the debtor countries drove the euro economy to stagnate.  
In the literature there have been already attempts to account for the EA membership 
using fixed effects, Sousa and Lochard (2011) used a gravity model to estimate the impact of 
the creation of the eurozone in bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel of 21 
countries between 1992-2005 they estimated the effect of a Dummy for the Euro in a Fixed 
effect model controlling for other variables that are likely to effect FDI. Doing several 
robustness tests their dummy kept the statistical relevant positive effect what led them to 
conclude that the Euro “has increased intra-EMU FDI stocks on average by around 30 percent”.  
Glick (2016) also used a gravity model but to measure the impact of the euro on trade. Using a 
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panel data of more than 200 countries and controlling for time-varying country and dyadic fixed 
effects he found that European Monetary Union expanded European trade around 50% and that 
the impact of EMU is higher for the older countries of the euro than for the newer. Our paper 




The basic estimation is panel fixed-effects corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  The equation for the baseline model is below.  
𝑔𝑖𝑡
5 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−5
′ 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
Where  𝑋𝑖𝑡−5
′  stands for the vector of control variables and 𝛽 the vector of Coefficients. 
The model controls for the conditional convergence test present in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992), i.e., controls for population growth and investment in human and physical capital while 
measuring the impact of initial per capita income in economic growth. It is augmented to 
include other variables that appeared with endogenous growth literature like measures of 
economic policy quality and economy openness in line with Sachs and Warner (1995). Then 
we also add country dummies to control for the impact of the euro or the crisis in economic 
growth. 
 My dependent variable will be 5-year cumulative overlapping growth rate. Five-year 
growth rate allows me to avoid cyclical movement, and mitigates reverse causality, normally 
present in these models, since 5-year growth cannot determinate variables in the beginning of 
the cycle. So, we use a model with 5 years growth rate based on independent variables in the 




So, the following model would be able to predict economic growth: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡
5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝛽2 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝛽4 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡−5
+ 𝛽5𝑔𝑜𝑣. 𝑐. 𝑔𝑖𝑡−5 +  𝛽6 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−5 +  𝛽7 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡−5
+ 𝛽8 𝑔. 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
Where 𝑔𝑖𝑡
5  is the real GDP growth rate in 5 year time, ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑖𝑡−5  stands 
for the natural logarithm of the GDP per head of population aged 15-64 years, 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡−5 is 
population growth (between 15-64 years), 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−5 is gross fixed capital formation (% 
GDP), 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡−5 is my proxy for human capital. 
We included also some variables to proxy policy choices1: (i) Government non-
productive consumption(𝑔𝑜𝑣. 𝑐. 𝑔𝑖𝑡−5), that is interpreted as a bad policy decision, so it is 
expected to have a negative impact on growth ; (ii) inflation (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−5) computed as ln(1+ 
Inflation rate): normally this value as to be lagged to avoid reverse causation, so that lower 
growth leads to higher inflation, but since we are looking at 5-year growth rate and present level 
we think there is no need. We also introduced, to expand the model beyond close economy, an 
indicator of openness (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡−5) and terms of trade growth rate (𝑔. 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡)(both 
expected to have a positive impact in growth). Terms of Trade growth rate in the regression 
won’t be the initial value but instead a 5-year growth rate computed in the same away as the 
GDP growth rate. The country dummies (𝜇𝑖) in the equation capture specific economic and 
social characteristics, that remain relatively constant over time. Furthermore, included year 
dummies (𝜗𝑡) to control for common shocks across countries, like the 2008’s crisis. 
                                                          
1 We also used an Indicator of Quality of economic institutions from KUNČIČ (2014), it was statistically 
significant however it made the other variables economic insignificant and did not changed the final conclusion, 
so we decided to not include it on the model 
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The baseline model after will be augment by introducing a Dummy for the Euro Area, 
i.e., a dummy that takes the value of 1 if at t the country uses euro as his currency and 0 
otherwise.  
𝑔𝑖𝑡
5 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−5
′ 𝛽 + 𝐸𝐴𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝐸𝑈𝑖 ,𝑡−5 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
EA is the dummy for the Euro Area at t-52. EU that is equal to 1 if the country is member of the 
European Union at t and 0 otherwise. Further we also control for other impacts like the crisis 
using dummies. 
The choice of within estimation allows me to answer the question: “Does adopting the 
euro affect Economic Growth?”, the fact that the within estimation exploits time-series 
properties of the data takes us to estimate the impact of the euro by comparing the evolution of 
the GDP per head growth before and after a country enter the single currency. 
 
3.2. Data and Variables 
We want to investigate the impact on real GDP per head of population aged 15-64 years 
growth of the euro’s introduction in the euro area economies. Our dataset has a total of 35 
OECD countries. Unlike World Samples our sample does not have large heterogeneity so there 
is no need to control for variables like region, conflicts or ethnicity. The dataset covers data 
from 1985 until 2015, we computed GDP per head of population aged 15-64 years expressed 
in Purchasing Power Parities with data from the OECD.Stat Database and the World Bank 
Database. The use of real GDP per working age person allows us to mitigate growth differences 
that are related with demographics and focus on the ability that the economies have to make the 
                                                          
2 EA considers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia an Spain. 
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most of available human resources, since it does not make distinctions between people 
employed, unemployed or out of the labor force (de Freitas, Pereira, and Torres , 2003). 
To proxy human capital I used an education variable, even though there is no consensus 
on the best proxy for human capital education is broadly used as a proxy, however a variable is 
difficult to find since the most used and commonly accepted variables are only availed from 5 
to 5 years, so we opted for a variable from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization: Gross enrollment ratio; that is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of 
age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education 
shown, in this case tertiary education. High education might be better to measure the differences 
between OECD countries (Grauwe and Ji (2016) finds Proportion of tertiary education to be 
positively correlated with the growth rate of per capita GDP). 
Trade Openness is measured as the sum of Imports and Exports of goods and services 
divided by GDP3. While General government final consumption expenditure (data extracted 
from World Bank and OECD national accounts data) includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services, as a ratio of GDP. From the International 
Monetary Fund, we obtained data on Inflation measured by the consumer price index annual 
change and Terms of trade is the ratio between index export prices and index import prices. 





                                                          
3 Stressing that the ratio is normally higher for smaller countries, Barro (2013) defends that this basic measure 
would not reflect policy influences, nevertheless we decided to keep it since it is widely use in growth 
regression, and other measures proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995) are not adequate to panel regression since 




Table 0- Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
Log (Initial GDP) 1,039 10.69 2.122 5.236 16.26 
Government Consumption 1,034 0.187 0.0426 0.0752 0.363 
Education 983 0.506 0.226 0.0244 1.139 
Openness 1,034 0.805 0.489 0.160 4.195 
Investment 1,034 23.04 % 4.055% 11.55% 39.40% 
Inflation 1,033 0.0607 0.130 -0.0458 1.880 
Population Growth 1,085 0.00635 0.00985 -0.0586 0.0670 
Terms of Trade Growth rate 863 0.0141 0.0928 -0.298 0.806 
𝑔5,𝑡 999 0.117 0.123 -0.249 0.633 
 
4. Results 
In Column (1) from Table 1 are reported the results from equation 2, the model explains 
a reasonable part of the within variation (within R-squared is 0.545) and is clustered at the 
country level. Across the different regressions the natural logarithm of GDP shows statistical 
significant coefficients that have the negative expected sign, so the model has evidence of 
conditional convergence, controlling for other variables when GDP per head increases the 
country expects lower GDP growth, ceteris paribus.  Education has the expected positive sign, 
nevertheless is not significant. The first thing that strikes is a negative impact of gross fixed 
capital formation (even if only marginally significant) 4.Government consumption shows the 
expected negative sign, for the reasons explained above. Both inflation and population growth 
have the expected negative sign, so for the given values of initial level of GDP and controlling 
for other variables it is expected that higher inflation and higher population growth imply lower 
economic grow, at a 5% significance level. As referred above the importance of openness to 
                                                          
4  We regressed all the equations in Table 1 without the Investment variable, but the outcomes did not change so 
we decided to keep it on the model. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) also find this negative relation in 
their five-year cumulative fixed effect between growth and private gross fixed capital formation while public 




growth is capture on the Trade Openness and Terms of Trade growth rate coefficients, since 
both have positive signs, being both statistically relevant, at least at 10%. 
Controlling for all variables described above the results in column (2) suggest that 
monetary integration matters. The dummy that considers the entering time of the countries in 
European Monetary Union (EA) has statistically negative impact in GDP per head growth at 
1% significance level when we consider a period between 1985-2015. Ceteris paribus, the 
adoption of the euro will reduce 5-year real growth rate, on average, by 5,88 percentage points.  
In column (3), the EA dummy is robust to the introduction of EU membership. EU controls for 
the European Union in the same away that EA controls for the euro, nevertheless it is not 
statistical significant. 
Since we consider a period until 2015, a major economic crisis is present in our sample:  
2008’s crisis somewhat affected all the economies in our sample  therefore it must be controlled 
by the time dummies, on the other hand the effects of this crisis were more persistent on the 
Euro Area countries ( what led to the further called Sovereign Debt Crisis) and that it is not 
fully captured by the model, time dummies won´t affectively capture this effect, meaning that 
the significance of our findings above might be undermined, so we estimated a new model that 
only captures growth rate until 2010.5 
                                                          




In the new regression, column (4), all the control variables keep the expected sign, then 
controlling for the Euro Area the first thing that strikes is that the dummy is no longer 
significant, as we can see in column (5) of Table 1. Not a surprise since the 2008’s crisis had a 
more persistent impact on the Euro Area being this evidence of the problems that these countries 
had to react to it.  Also controlled for the European Union in column (6) however the conclusion 
is the same.   
The first regressions seem to show that the euro had a negative impact on growth 
however that impact seems to be related with the poorer performance of these economies after 
2010 and not before. Instead of having two periods, we created a dummy for the crisis so that 
Table 1 – Baseline Model and the Euro Effect 
 
 1985-2015 1985-2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ln(GDP per head) -0.308*** -0.311*** -0.316*** -0.360*** -0.360*** -0.364*** 
 (-5.037) (-4.655) (-4.757) (-5.187) (-4.850) (-4.875) 
educ 0.00306 -0.00360 0.0324 0.137** 0.130* 0.145* 
 (0.0467) (-0.0536) (0.441) (2.166) (1.984) (1.999) 
Investment -0.00316* -0.00227 -0.00250 -0.00289 -0.00227 -0.00240 
 (-1.858) (-1.294) (-1.319) (-1.245) (-0.950) (-0.983) 
gov.c.g -0.171 -0.0380 -0.159 -0.304 -0.245 -0.272 
 (-0.327) (-0.0774) (-0.317) (-0.476) (-0.393) (-0.438) 
Inflation -0.153** -0.122* -0.126* -0.107** -0.0894* -0.0899* 
 (-2.308) (-1.921) (-1.996) (-2.163) (-1.925) (-1.936) 
pop_gr -2.713** -2.553* -2.608* -2.516* -2.424* -2.449* 
 (-2.092) (-1.959) (-1.977) (-1.795) (-1.765) (-1.762) 
Open 0.103* 0.134** 0.148** 0.195** 0.218*** 0.226*** 
 (1.700) (2.306) (2.294) (2.375) (2.776) (2.819) 
g.termsoftrade 0.120* 0.100 0.0902 0.182** 0.166** 0.161** 
 (1.760) (1.314) (1.209) (2.672) (2.242) (2.140) 
EA  -0.0588*** -0.0573**  -0.0382 -0.0377 
  (-2.788) (-2.628)  (-1.646) (-1.604) 
EU   -0.0319   -0.0177 
   (-0.994)   (-0.667) 
Constant 3.407*** 3.364*** 3.438*** 3.874*** 3.831*** 3.868*** 
 (5.245) (4.720) (4.862) (5.062) (4.688) (4.738) 
       
Observations 779 779 779 619 619 619 
R-squared 0.545 0.566 0.571 0.501 0.511 0.512 
Number of id 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and* at 10%. Year 
Dummies are not reported. Estimations are based on equation (2) augmented to an Euro Area and 




it takes the value of 1 if the country is part of the Euro Area after 2010 (EA x Crisis) and a 
dummy for the Euro Area that does not consider the period after 2010 (EA x no Crisis)6. So, 
when we have the Full Sample the effect of the crisis is larger than the effect of the period 
before the crisis. But in this case the crisis dummy also accounts for the euro’s impact on 
Slovakia and Slovenia, since they have entered in 2007 and 2009, respectively, and due to our 
methodology, the effect of the euro in these countries is only captured after 2010.  And since 
we cannot accurately separate the effect of the crisis from the two late entries in our sample we 
drop both from the sample 
We can now see that in fact Slovakia and Slovenia were negatively affect by the euro, 
the coefficient with both countries is -0,058 while without them it is smaller (-0.051)7, and that 
the period before the crisis is no longer significant, while, holding everything else constant, in 
crisis years on average GDP per head of the Euro Area countries decreases by 7,68%, in 5 
years-time, when compared to non-crisis years. So, when we exclude the Slovakia and Slovenia 
effect the euro economies experienced lower growth when joining the euro, however this effect 
is only relevant because of the period that incorporates the Sovereign Debt Crisis, so after 2010. 
 
 
                                                          
6  Regressions in table 2 
7 We have disproportionate periods of time with euro and without the euro, so it is more likely to find differences 





When we considered the full period the euro negatively affects real GDP growth, but 
when we divided in two this lower growth is correlated with the economic crisis and not with 
the adoption of the euro as a currency by these countries, nevertheless this effect was found 
statistically relevant for the Euro as a group but indeed it can diverge from to country to country 
or even form group to group of countries. To investigate these differences, we define different 
groups and we will try to understand the different impacts of the euro and of the crisis on them. 
We divided the Euro Area Dummy in 3 different variables: (i) GIIPS that considers 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland;(ii) FOUNDER that considers France, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Germany; (iii) AustFin that considers only Austria and Finland. 
Table 2 – Timing of the Effect 1985-2015 with crisis dummy 
 
 Full Sample No Slovakia and Slovenia 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
EA -0.0401*  -0.0512** -0.0339  
 (-1.736)  (-2.118) (-1.390)  
EA x Crisis -0.0392 -0.0793***  -0.0429* -0.0768** 
 (-1.666) (-2.956)  (-1.810) (-2.509) 
EA x no Crisis  -0.0401*   -0.0339 
  (-1.736)   (-1.390) 
Constant 3.454*** 3.454*** 3.451*** 3.463*** 3.463*** 
 (4.785) (4.785) (4.873) (4.776) (4.776) 
      
Observations 779 779 746 746 746 
R-squared 0.575 0.575 0.564 0.570 0.570 
Number of id 35 35 33 33 33 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and* at 10%. Year Dummies 
and other control variables are not reported. First 2 regressions are for the full sample, in the last 3 Slovakia and 
Slovenia are dropped. crisis dummy takes value of 1 if the country is part of the Euro Area after 2010 
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In table (4) we regressed equation (3) but instead of EA variable we consider each group above 
comparing it with the Eurozone economies that don´t belong to that group.8 
In column (2) from table 3 we can see that the effect of euro on the GIIPS’ economies 
is not relevant, so despite common belief that these economies where in a path of  lower growth 
since they joined the euro that it is not what the evidence shows, regardless of the period 





                                                          
8 For example, in column (2) in table 3 nonGIIPS is a dummy that includes the countries that are part of the EA 
but aren´t in GIIPS group, for example France or Austria. 
Table 3 – Impact of the Euro in different groups  
 1985-2015 1985-2010 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
GIIPS  -0.0485    -0.0131   
  (-1.278)    (-0.343)   
nonGIIPS  -0.0537**    -0.0528**   
  (-2.247)    (-2.340)   
EA -0.0512**    -0.0344    
 (-2.118)    (-1.474)    
FOUNDER   -0.0888***    -0.0804***  
   (-4.316)    (-3.879)  
noFOUNDER   -0.0238    0.00272  
   (-0.703)    (0.0867)  
AustFin    0.00496    0.00769 
    (0.192)    (0.342) 
noAustFin    -0.0660**    -0.0450* 
    (-2.594)    (-1.715) 
Constant 3.451*** 3.457*** 3.651*** 3.463*** 3.849*** 3.881*** 4.086*** 3.862*** 
 (4.873) (4.874) (5.344) (4.791) (4.696) (4.898) (5.392) (4.679) 
         
Observations 746 746 746 746 596 596 596 596 
R-squared 0.564 0.564 0.573 0.571 0.511 0.515 0.529 0.515 
Number of id 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and* at 10%. Year Dummies and other 
control variables are not reported. Groups are GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; Founder: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands; AustFin: Austria and Finland; and no Groups are the countries not in that 




On the other hand, non GIIPS and non AustFin dummies are relevant , while the dummy 
that considers the countries in the Group FOUNDER is relevant, at 1% significance level, 
meaning that the euro had negative statistical effect in these economies, i.e., holding everything 
else constant, when joining the euro area,  on average, the GDP per head of countries in the 
FOUNDER group decreases by 8,88%, in 5 years-time, when compared to non-euro years. 
These results are robust to a smaller period (until 2010), suggesting that the effect of the euro 
on the group FOUNDER was transversal to the whole period and unlike the Euro as a group 
because of the 2010’s crisis. Nevertheless, we can see that all the coefficient when we regress 
only until 2010 become smaller (less negative) suggesting that in fact there might be a crisis 
impact, however we cannot compare both coefficients to see if they are statistical different. 
 
Table 4 – Impact of the Crisis in Different Groups (1985-2015) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
GIIPS x Crisis -0.0835   
 (-1.692)   
GIIPS x No Crisis -0.00781   
 (-0.222)   
FOUNDER x Crisis  -0.0874***  
  (-3.209)  
FOUNDER x No Crisis  -0.0806***  
  (-4.518)  
AustFincrisis x Crisis   -0.00969 
   (-0.581) 
AustFin x No Crisis   0.00792 
   (0.357) 
Constant 3.394*** 3.727*** 3.423*** 
 (4.593) (6.077) (5.248) 
Observations    
R-squared 746 746 746 
Number of id 0.564 0.571 0.546 
Crisis=nocrisis 4.469 0.0834 0.503 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and* at 10%. Year Dummies, 
constant and other control variables are not reported. The test of equivalence of coefficient is present in Crisis=nocrisis, 







So lastly, in table 4 we make regression like those in table 2, where each group considers 
a period before the crisis and after the euro introduction and another period after crisis, so in 
Table 4 we regress each group dividing it between the two periods. The FOUNDER coefficients 
are statistical significant in both Periods however when we test if the coefficients are 
statistically different the F-statistic is of 0.0834, so we reject that they are different, confirming 
that the euro impact in the FOUNDER group is across all period and furthermore that the crisis 
seems to not affect this countries as a group. 
This leaves us with one last question, if the crisis affects the euro economies which 
group of countries are mostly affect by it? So now knowing that the euro has a significant impact 
on the FOUNDER real GDP per growth and that the euro area experienced lower growth during 
the period after 2010, in the following test we only consider these two variables and drop the 
dummy for the EA. So, crossing the Groups defined before with the dummy for the crisis (Table 
5), we find that the GIIPS faced in fact a higher impact than the average during the crisis years 
(already in Table 4 we could see that both periods were statistically different), and when 
compared with the other groups crisis years it is the only that has a negative statistical 
coefficient. So, as we can see in column (7) in Table 5 when holding everything else constant, 
in crisis years on average GDP per head on the GIIPS countries decreases by 1,58%, per year, 
when compared to non-crisis years, however we cannot say that this effect is due to the presence 























Table 5- Effect of the crisis (1985-2015) 
          
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
FOUNDER -0.0718*** -0.0700*** -0.0738*** -0.0749*** -0.0669*** -0.0806*** -0.0781*** -0.0789*** -0.0783*** 
 (-3.475) (-3.582) (-3.931) (-4.025) (-3.255) (-4.455) (-4.011) (-4.016) (-4.326) 
noFOUNDER -0.00479         
 (-0.145)         
crisis -0.0451* -0.0472* -0.0193 -0.0158 -0.0541* -0.0626*    
 (-1.963) (-1.767) (-0.918) (-0.607) (-1.705) (-1.739)    
GIIPS x Crisis   -0.0577 -0.0609   -0.0729* -0.0743* -0.0742* 
   (-1.364) (-1.364)   (-1.763) (-1.791) (-1.764) 
AustFin x Crisis    -0.00797 0.0289   -0.0218 -0.0220 
    (-0.292) (0.883)   (-1.001) (-0.978) 
FOUNDER x Crisis      0.0422   -0.00165 
      (1.113)   (-0.0691) 
Constant 3.669*** 3.681*** 3.630*** 3.628*** 3.678*** 3.610*** 3.626*** 3.623*** 3.625*** 
 (5.277) (5.658) (5.340) (5.327) (5.597) (5.305) (5.358) (5.333) (5.291) 
          
Observations 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 746 
R-squared 0.579 0.579 0.584 0.584 0.580 0.581 0.583 0.583 0.583 
Number of id 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and* at 10%. Year Dummies, constant and other 




The literature review leaved us with mixed feelings, at lead us to ask our first question: 
“Does adopting the euro affect Economic Growth?”. Second, literature often mentions struggle 
from part of the less developed countries of the south to impose their view in the decision 
making of the Euro Area leading us to ask if in fact the impact of the euro was the same for all 
countries. To address this question, we used a Fixed Effect model, that considers the OECD 
economies between 1985-2015, to explain GDP growth and used a dummy to control for the 
creation of the Euro. 
Firstly, we found that either European Union or Euro Area membership have a 
significant impact on growth. At first, membership of the Euro Area seems to have a negative 
impact but when we controlled for the crisis after 2010 the effect becomes insignificant. When 
we look if the euro has differentiated impact, the results suggest so. The countries that founded 
the European Union experienced a lower growth across all the period of the euro´s functioning 
and that effect is not related with the crisis. This result is surprising, despite common knowledge 
this study suggests that indeed the euro harmed GDP growth in these economies. 
We also found a negative impact of the crisis in the euro economies, nevertheless we 
were able to isolate that effect as being specific of the GIIPS economies. We cannot, however, 
infer that this result is because these countries are euro economies or, for example, that these 
countries bear most of the cost of the Sovereign Debt Countries ( Grauwe and Ji 2016). Our 
approach did not leave space to account for the impact of the new entries, leaving that effect 
to be explained out of our model.  
Like other cross-country growth analysis our work is plagued with the problem of 
ambiguous choice of variables, as we use multiple variables to proxy what in fact we want to 
capture (Levine and Renelt 1992). Nevertheless, we use variables commonly used in growth 
regression therefore we believe that our conclusions remain valid. A 5-year approach using 
21 
 
lagged initial values and the fixed effect methodology mitigate the problems of endogeneity, at 
the same time the use of an OECD sample reduces other problem commonly present in growth 
regression that is parameters endogeneity. 
Why do the FOUNDER groups grow less? Why do the GIIPS GDP growth is affected 
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